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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

No. 16231

LOIS S. COOK, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is

an

action whereby plaintiffs-

respondents,

LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, et al.,

(hereinafter

"THORNOCK"),

suant to §78-40-1,
9A 1977),

to

et

~·,

all minerals

seek to quiet title, purUtah Code Ann.
in,

upon,

or

(Repl. Vol.

under

certain

real property located in Rich County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
THORNOCK'S Complaint was filed on January 30,
1978.

Thereafter,

the court entered its Order Allowing

Service by Publication (R. 17-18).

Service by Publica-

tion was completed on February 23, 1978, (R. 36).

COOK

filed her Answer on February 21, 1978 and a default
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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certificate as to all defendants except COOK was entered
on April 6, 1978, (R. 38).
Thereafter,
ment

(R.

31-3),

THORNOCK

in

moved

response

for

to which COOK filed an

Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 43
The

lower

court held

THORNOCK 'S Motion for

Summary Judg-

its

et~.).

initial

hearing on

Summary Judgment on April 17,
allowi~

1978, and continued the hearing, without date,

both

parties

an

opportunity

to

file

additional docu-

ments.
A second

hearing on THORNOCK' S Motion for

Summary Judgment was held on September 5, 1978, at which
time the matter was taken under advisement.
Subsequent to this hearing, COOK filed her
Second Amended Answer
On October

and Counterclaim (R.

23,

1978,

339-48).

the lower court entered

its Memorandum Decision granting

THORNOCK 'S Motion for

Summary Judgment (R. 349), and entering its Judgment and
Decree of Quiet Title (R. 358-61 and 354-57).
On November

28,

1978, COOK filed her

"Objec-

tion to Plaintiff's Proposed Decree of Quiet Title,
Judgment and Order Releasing Lis Pendens and Motion for
Re-argument"

(R.

368-72).

The lower court rendered it

5

Memorandum Decision denying COOK' s Objection and Motion
on December 11, 1978, (R. 377).

COOK'S Notice of Appeal

was filed on December 26, 1978, (R. 380).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant,

COOK,

seeks

reversal

of

the lower court's Judgment of November 16, 1978, and of
that court's Memorandum Decision dated December 11,
1978.
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
affirmation

of

the

Judgment

of

THORNOCK,

November

16,

seek
1978,

the Decree of Quiet Title of that same date and of the
Memorandum Decision of December 11, 1978.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, only those facts
which were properly before the lower court pursuant to
Rule

56,

lated.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Those facts,

shall

be

re-

which may properly be considered,

consist of the documents which constitute the chain of
title to

the disputed minerals,

Defendant-Appellant COOK,
those

statements

of

filed by THORNOCK.
except

for

given at her deposition,
contained

in

and

the affidavits

Although COOK'S Statement of Facts,

characterizations,

THORNOCK wishes
details set

fact

the testimony of

is

largely

correct,

this court to become aware of certain

forth

below,

which were omitted from that

Statement.
CHAIN OF TITLE
For purposes of clarity, only those aspects of
the Chain of Title which are pertinent to this action,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or which are claimed by COOK to constitute a defect
in THORNOCK'S title will be discussed.
Through

various

predecessors-in-interest,
Hatch,

obtained

title

conveyances,

Joseph
to

Hatch

THORNOCK'S

and

approximately

Catherine

1,946 acres

of real property located in Rich County, Utah.
COOK alleges two of those conveyances,
which

Joseph

Hatch

obtained

title,

first

conveyance

thro~h

are

subject to

involves

Utah State

question.
The

Patent No. 15259, which purports to convey certain real
property to

"Joseph E.

This conveyance affects
2,900

acres

(R. 238).

approximately 273 acres of the

to which THORNOCK seeks to quiet title.

The

second

involves Patent No.
250)

Hatch and company"

conveyance

questioned

by COOK

15260, dated November 22, 1933, (R.

which purports to convey certain real property to

"Joseph E.

Hatch and Ezra T.

Hatch".

This questioned

conveyance involves approximately 80 of the 1, 946 acres
in question.
Subsequent to these questioned conveyances a~
to

others

through which Joseph

obtained title,

and Catherine Hatch

the entire 1, 946 acres was conveyed to

their four daughters (R. 245).
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Thereafter,

by Warranty Deed dated April 25,

1947, the four sisters conveyed the subject property to

w.

Aden

Thornock (R. 217).
On May 14, 1950, a Contract and Agreement was

executed by and between Aden W. Thornock, party of the
first part, and Lawrence B. Johnson, party of the second
part,

for

the

sale

of

the subject property

(R.

218).

That Contract provides in pertinent part:
No. 5.
The party of the first part
herein reserves all rights according
to what rights may have been conferred in the patents to the abovedescribed land for all coal, oil and
other minerals on the abovedescribed land.
(R. 218)
Pursuant to that Contract, on June 30, 1950, a
Warranty Deed

(hereinafter the "Thornock-Johnson Deed")

conveying

subject property

was

the

executed

(R.

to Lawrence B.

That Deed provides

219).

Johnson

in perti-

nent part:
Reserving to the grantees herein all
coal, oil and other minerals as may
have been granted in the original
patents to the above-described
land.
[emphasis added]
(R. 219)
On

December

1,

1952,

defendant Lois S.

Cook

and Howland J. cook, now deceased, obtained title to the
surface of the subject property through a Warranty Deed,
(hereinafter,
Lawrence B.

the

"Johnson-Cook

Johnson,

and

Deed")

his wife,

executed

Lois L.

by

Johnson
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(R.

220).

That Deed contains the identical language of

reservation as found

in the Thornock-Johnson Deed.

It

provides:
Reserving to the Grantee herein all
coal, oil and other minerals as may
have been granted in the original
patent to the above-described land.
[Emphasis added] (R. 220)
Thereafter,
sion generated

by

in order

this

to

alleviate any confu-

obvious scrivener

executed

Quitclaim Deed For Coal Oil and Other

Deed"),

(hereinafter,

on September

interest

in

the

2,

subject

the

Cook

and

s.

clause,

Minerals,

J.

in the

reservation
a

Howland

error
Lois

"Cook-Thornock

1959,

Quitclaim

thereby conveying

minerals

to Aden

Cook

w.

their

Thornock

(R. 224).
It

is

important

Thornock Quitclaim Deed"

to

note

that

the

"Cook-

specifically describes the

interest intended to be conveyed as follows:
The Granters intend by this instrument to convey to the Grantee only
the rights reserved to the Grantee
for coal, oil and other minerals as
may have been granted in the original patents to the above-described
land and as reserved
[in
certain identified documents]
in the official records of Rich
County, Utah.
(R. 224)
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVITS
The
widow of Aden

affidavit

w.

of

Lucille M.

Thornock,

(R.

Thornock,

103-20), establishes
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the

several uncontroverted facts.
Aden

w.

Thornock began leasing the mineral estate which

is presently at
aware

of

some

the mineral
that

Briefly, in 1958 and 1959

issue.

"minor

estate

reason

During

that period,

he became

problem" with the reservation of

in the various conveyances and for

requested

COOK

and

her,

now

deceased,

husband to provide him with a quitclaim deed to the
mineral

estate.

To

this

end,

affiant

and

her

husband

conveyed an additional forty acres to the Cooks, to no
avail.
It became necessary to retain an attorney,
M. C.

Harris,

Esq.

formal demand,

of Logan, Utah.

Mr.

Harris made a

attached to Lucille Thornock's affidavit

as Exhibit "A", upon the Cooks for a quitclaim deed.

In

response to the demands of Mr. Harris, Mrs. Thornock was
supplied
Coal,

with

Oil

attached

a document 'entitled

and

to

Other

her

Minerals",

affidavit

"Quitclaim Deed for
a

copy of which

as Exhibit "C"

is

(R. 118-20).

In addition, Mrs. Thornock states that neither
herself,

nor

her

late

consulted

Mr.

Victor

husband,

Sagers of

ever
the

retained

firm

or

of Dahl

&

Sagers.
The affidavit of Burton H. Harris supports and
corroborates
121-25).

Mr.

the

affidavit

Harr is,

of

Lucille Thornock

(R.

the present managing partner of

the law firm of Harris, Preston & Gutke of Logan, Utah,
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states that M.

C.

Harris was formally a partner in the

predecessor firm of Harr is, Preston

&

Gutke and that the

records of the predecessor firm have been maintained in
the regular course of business.

Mr. Harr is states that

the documents attached to his affidavit as Exhibits "A"
and

"B"

(R.

124-25)

are maintained

in the "closed" law

off ice files of the late M. C. Harr is.
are copies of

the

letter

of

demand

Those documents
and transmittal

letter which also are attached to the affidavit of Mrs.
Thornock.
DEPOSITION OF LOIS S. COOK
The testimony of COOK given during the taking
of

her

dicts

deposition on March 21,
the

denials

and

Second Amended Answer
Specifically,
Cook-Thornock

Quitclaim

1978,

affirmative

directly contra-

allegations

and Counterclaim (R.

of her

339-48).

Mrs.

Cook testified that the

Deed

was

executed

by

Q.

[By Mr. Jensen]
Was this
document, and I am referring
to Exhibit 1 .
[the cookThornock Quitclaim Deed]
.,
executed because of the continual requests of Mr. Thornock,
to which you have referred?

A.

He hounded us continually and my
husband said, "You sign this
paper."
So I did, but he was
after us continually.
(Cook Depo. p.10, lines 11-16)

In

addition,

in

support

of

the

herself:

testimony

quoted immediately above, Mrs. Cook stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

[By Mr. Jensen]
Referring to
the third page of Exhibit •1•
[the Cook-Thornock
Quitclaim Deed]
. which is
before you, and directing your
attention to the signature
line, which is signature
one--directing your attention to
the signature line thereon, does
that appear
to be your
signature?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And does that appear
signature of your
husband?

A.

I don't know but I would say it
looks like it.

Q.

The question is:
Do you have
any reason to believe that
these signatures to which I have
directed your attention are
anything 9ther than the signatures they purport to be?

A.

No.
(Cook

It looks like it.

19-25,

to be the
deceased

Depo. p. 13,
p. 14, lines

lines
1, 2,

13-16)
As to the allegations of coercion, threat and
duress

contained

in

COOK'S

Second Amended

Answer

and

Counterclaim (R. 340), Mrs. Cook testified:
Q.

[By Mr. Jensen]
And when you
say that he was hounding you for
something, can you remember what
it was?

A.

Well, no.
He wanted us to sign
some papers and I didn't believe
in it.
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Q.

I understand that, but do you
recall what Mr. Thornock said to
you?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you recall what he may have
said to your husband?

A.

I don't know.
(Cook Depo. p. 19, lines 10-19)

Q.

[By Mr. Jensen]
I am referring
to Aden Thornock.
Did he
threaten you with physical
violence when he approached
you?

A.

Oh, no.

Q.

Nothing like that?

A.

No.
(Cook Depo. p. 21, lines 13-18)

Q.

[By Mr. Axland]
I want you to
itemize for me each and every
incident wherein Mr. Thornock
was continually after you to
sign something.
[Instruction to the witness by Mr.
Oman omitted]
That's

too

A.

I can't do that.
many years ago.

Q.

I want you to give me your best
recollection then, Mrs. Cook, of
precisely what Mr. Thornock
did.

A.

I don't know.
I can't do that.
I can't do that.
( c 0 0 k Depo. p. 45, lines
15-24)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 10 -

A.

I can't say the precise things
that he said years ago.

Q.

Did you have conversations with
Mr. Thornock.

A.

Not many, only when he came to
me.
(Cook Depo. p. 45, lines 3-6)

Q.

[By Mr. Ax land]
Did anyone
force you to sign Exhibit "l"
[the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed]
to your
deposition?

A.

No.

Q.

Did anyone threaten you?

A.

No.

Q.

Did anyone coerce you to sign
Exhibit "l"?

A.

I
signed it ·because my husband
wanted me to.

Q.

Did anyone, to your knowledge,
force or threaten your husband
to require him to sign it?

A.

I

Q.

Do you have any facts in your
possession at this time that
anyone, Mr. Thornock or anyone
else in the world, threatened
your husband to sign Exhibit
"l"?

A.

I

Q.

Mrs. Cook, do you have any facts
in your possession.

A.

No.

don't know.

'

don't know.
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Q.

Did anyone threaten you or your
husband, fore ing him to sign
Exhibit "l"?

A.

No.
(Cook Depo. p. 51,
p. 52, lines 1-13)

lines 19-25,

Q.

Did anyone use bodily force to
require your husband to sign
Exhibit "l"?

A.

Not that I know of.

Q.

Do you have any facts that
anyone threatened your husband
with any kind of action if he
did not sign Exhibit "l"?

A.

Not that I know of.

Q.

Okay.
Now you have indicated
further that Mr. Thornock was
not present when Exhibit "l" was
signed; isn't that correct?

A.

Right.
(Cook Depo.
14-17)

p.

53,

lines 2-7,

In summary, Mrs. Cook testified that:

( 1)

she

I

signed

the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed,

( 2)

the

signature which purports to be that of Howland J. cook
appears

to be that of her deceased husband,

( 3)

she

knows of no facts which would tend to indicate that the
signatures which appear on the qui tel aim deed are other
than
was

what

they

signed

at

purport
the

to

request

be,

(4)

the quitclaim deed

of Aden W.

Thornock,
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(5) a

quitclaim deed was
at the

the only document which she signed

request of Mr.

characterized her
"hounding",

Thornock,

( 6)

contacts with Aden

she does

although she

w.

Thornock as

not recall even the substance of

Thornock 's statements during those encounters,

(7)

she was not threatened or coerced by Mr. Thornock,

(8)

Mr.

to her

knowledge,

threatened

nor

her

deceased

coerced and,

was not present at

husband was neither

( 9)

Aden

w.

Thornock

the time the quitclaim deed was

signed.
Other than in matters of characterization, the
Statement of Facts contained in COOK'S Brief on Appeal
appears to be correct with the exception of the statement contained

in subparagraph

COOK' s Brief.

In essence,

recollection
Deed.

of

executing

(d)

found on page 5 of

COOK has stated she has no
the

Cook-Thornock

Quitclaim

This statement is correct insofar as Mrs.

testified to no

Cook

specific recollection of the immediate

circumstances surrounding the execution of the quitclaim
deed.

However, the court's attention is directed to the

fact that Mrs. Cook does not dispute the authenticity of
the signatures appearing on that deed, (Cook Depo. pages
37, 38),

and that she does recall executing that docu-

ment at the

request

of Mr.

Thornock

and her,

now de-

ceased, husband (Cook Depo. p. 10, lines 11-16).
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ARGUMENT
Defendant-appellant COOK,
Appeal,

her

Brief on

claims error on the part of the lower court in

two respects.
fact

in

One claim involves an alleged question of

pertaining

Quitclaim Deed,

to

the

validity

the other,

of

the

Cook-Thornock

an alleged error

of law in

the interpretation of the Thornock' s chain of title and
a consequent claim by adverse possession.

Those issues

will be discussed separately.
As

COOK makes

no

objection

to

the lower

court's ruling concerning the scrivener errors found in
the

reservation clauses of

Johnson-Cook Warranty Deeds
will not be addressed

the Thornock-Johnson and
that aspect of this action

(see the lower court's first and

second Memorandum Decisions, R.

349 and 377).

POINT I
COOK MAY NOT PROPERLY ASSERT A CLAIM BY VIRTUE OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND MAY NOT RAISE AN ALLEGED
DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S TITLE AS A DEFENSE
Two

fundamental

precepts of the law preclude

COOK'S claim to title by adverse possession and her
assertion of alleged defects in Thornock' s chain of
title.

Those fundamental considerations are:

(1) under

Utah law one may claim through adverse possession only
under a claim of title, and (2)

in defense of an action

to quiet title,

a defect in plaintiff's chain of title

may be asserted

only

if

the defendant claims title by

virtue of the defect.
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Sections
(Rep!. Vol.

78-12-8

and

Utah Code Ann.

9A 1977) provide for assertion of title by

virtue of adverse possession.
for

78-12-10

adverse

possession

by

Section 78-12-8 provides

those

who

enter

possession

under a claim of title founded upon a written instrument
or judgment.

Section 78-12-10 provides for adverse

possession under
instrument or

a claim not founded upon a written

judgment but under

There

is

no

provision

a

claim of title.

under

Utah

law for

assertion of adverse possession where the claimant has
entered into possession without claim of title.
Equally basic to the law of real property is
the proposition that a defendant in an action to quiet
title

cannot

superior

title

defeat plaintiff's title by showing
in

some

third

defendant makes no claim.

person

a

through whom the

As noted by the court in

Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Hatton,

156

Kan. 673, 135 p. 2d 559 ( 1943):
In an action to quiet title where it
is shown that the plaintiff is in
actual possession of the property in
controversy, the defendant cannot
defeat the plaintiff's action except
by showing a paramount right in
himself.
He cannot defeat such action by showing a superior title in
some third person. (135 P.2d at 563)
This

basic

proposition

is perhaps most

suc-

cinctly stated at 65 AmJur 2d QUIETING TITLE §45 as
follows:
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One cannot defeat a quiet title bill
by showing that the complainant's
claim or interest . • . is subject
to superior rights in third persons
who are not parties to the suit; it
is sufficient that the interest
asserted by complainant in possession be superior to that of those
who are parties defendant.
In this
regard, it has been said that the
court determines the rights of the
parties under the pleadings and
evidence, grants proper relief, and
determines the better title as
between the parties to the proceeding, though a title superior to the
rights of either party may be held
by stranger to the suit.
In the present action, COOK asserts title to
approximately

352.88

acres

through

a

simultaneous

contradiction of both these basic principles.
In brief, COOK argues that THORNOCK'S chain of
title is defective by virtue of the absence of conveyances of

approximately

Ezra Hatch

to

80

acres from Joseph Hatch and

Joseph Hatch

approximately 272.88 acres

and

Katie Hatch and of

from Joseph E. Hatch and

company to Joseph Hatch and Katie Hatch.
As these parcels are included in the property
conveyed to COOK by Johnson, COOK,

of course, has been

in actual possession of the surface since the date of
conveyance.
COOK

argues

that

neither THORNOCK nor her
ti. tl e

to

this

small

predecessors-in-interest

h e ld

portion of

to the alleged defects and

the

land due
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d

--further that she has obtained title to the same through
adverse

possession.

For

purposes of clarification,

a

simplified diagram of the chain of title with emphasis
on the

alleged

defects

is

attached

hereto

as Exhibit

nA n.

As
Exhibit

is

"A",

apparent from

COOK'S

Aden W. Thornock.
of any

the diagram attached as

claim of title

COOK has no claim of title by virtue

interest which may reside

Joseph E.

is derived through

Hatch and company.

in Ezra Hatch or

in

Therefore, she derives no

interest from the alleged defects in title.
For

these

reasons,

COOK

is

placed

in

the

incongruous position of either denying her own claim of
title

or

admitting

the

validity

of

THORNOCK'S

title.

An essential element of COOK'S adverse possession

is

an

assertion

that

under a claim of title.
through Aden
title COOK

w.

she possesses

the property

That claim of title is derived

Thornock.

By asserting

simultaneously

concedes

the

this claim of
validity of

THORNOCK'S title.
In short, Cook has attempted to simultaneously
deny

and

assert

the

validity

of

THORNOCK 'S

title.

Unlike Joseph Heller's famed "Catch-22", there
is an avenue of escape from this logical labyrinth.
COOK may not claim title by adverse possession for the
reason

that

an

essential

element

of

her

assertion

is
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self-defeating.

In

fact,

any allegation that THORNOCK

has no title to the questioned 300 acres also serves as
a

denial of COOK'S

thereby

rendering

claim of
her

a

title to the same parcel,

stranger

to

the

title and

defeating any claim by adverse possession.
Similarly,

COOK

may not

raise

the alleged

defects in THORNOCK' S chain of title in defense of this
quiet

title

action.

By asserting

those defects, she,

of necessity, denies her own title to the questioned 300
acres,

thus becoming a

stranger

stranger

to the title.

As a

to the title she has no standing to attack

THORNOCK'S title.
In summary, COOK must concede the validity of
THORNOCK'S
adverse

title

as

possession,

a

prerequisite

and

for

that

adverse possession must fail.

to

an assertion of

reason

the

claim by

In addition, she may not

raise the alleged defect in THORNOCK' s chain of title as
a defense to

th~

quiet title action because by doing so,

she becomes a stranger to the 300 acres thus precluding
her

attack

on THORNOCK 'S

title

as

to

that portion.

POINT I I
SHOULD THIS COURT FIND COOK'S CLAIM BY
ADVERSE POSSESSION VALID, TITLE TO THE
MINERALS REMAINS IN THORNOCK
Should this Court find COOK'S claim by adverse
possession
involved

in

to

approximately

300

of

this action to be valid,

the 1,946 acres
THORN OCK still
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retains title to the minerals, for two distinct reasons.
The doctrine

of

after-acquired

title

is applicable

to

the reservation of minerals in the Thornock-Johnson and
Johnson-Cook Deeds and also to the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed.
The lower court has ruled that the language of
reservation found
Cook deeds

in the Thornock-Johnson and Johnson-

serves to reserve all rights to minerals

to the grantors (R. 349 and 377).

COOK does not contest

that portion of the court's decision.
The effect of this reservation of title to
minerals is to "reconvey" the minerals from the grantee
back to the grantor.
This

basic distinction between a reservation

and an exception

is noted

at

23 AmJur

2d DEEDS §262,

where it is stated:
Where the terms are used in their
strict or accurate sense, there is
an important distinction between a
"reservation" and "exception"
in a conveyance of land.
A
"reservation," on the one hand, is
the creation in behalf of the
grantor of a new right issuing out
of the thing granted, something
which did not exist as an
independent right before the grant.
On the other hand, an "exception"
operates to withdraw some part of
the thing granted which would
otherwise pass to the grantee under
the general description • . . A
reservation is the taking back of a
part of that already granted ·
In short, an exception exludes some
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part of the thing from the conveyance and the title to that
part remains in the grantor by
virtue of its original title, while
a reservation creates a new right
out of the subject of the grant and
is originated by the conveyance.
This Court has
important
Ut.2d

distinction

226,

507

P.2d

in

recently recognized this
Burton v. United States,

710

(1973)

where

29

the court

stated:
An exception excludes from the grant
the property or estate therein
described.
If a conveyance contains
a reservation, the entire property
or estate described passes to the
grantee, subject to the right,
estate, or easements reserved.
The
£~~~£Y~iiQ~_££~~!~~-~-~~~-£i~g!
issuing out of the property granted,
which did not exist as an independent right before the grant [emphasis
added] (507 P.2d at 712).
As a reservation creates a new and independent
right issuing from the grantee back to the gr an tor, it
must be treated as a conveyance.
By virtue of the provisions of Section 57-1-3
Utah Code Ann.

(Repl.

Vol.

6A 1974)

a grant of fee

simple is presumed unless it appears from the conveyance
that a lesser estate was intended.
ing
in

an
the

No language evidenc-

intent to convey a lesser estate is found
reservation clauses of

either

the Thornock-

Johnson or Johnson-Cook deeds; therefore, a reconveyance
of

all minerals

to

the grantor

in fee

is presumed.
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Because the reconveyance of minerals is in fee
simple, the provisions as to after-acquired title found
in Section 57-1-10 Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. Vol. GA 1974)

are applicable.
Therefore,
obtained title
possession,

to

should the court find that COOK

the questioned 300 acres by adverse

title to

the minerals passed

through application of

immediately,

the doctrine of after-acquired

title, from COOK to Johnson and immediately from Johnson
to Aden W. Thornock and thence to his heirs.
The doctrine of after-acquired title is
similarly applicable to the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim
Deed, but on a somewhat different basis.
In her Brief on Appeal, COOK has ably cited
those cases and authorities which stand for the general
proposition that the doctrine of after-acquired title is
inapplicable

in the context of a quitclaim deed.

However, Cook has failed to note the rationale for this
general rule and hence the exception to that rule which
is presently applicable.
The general proposition,

as well as the

exception, are stated at 23 AmJur 2d DEEDS Section 303
as follows:
A conveyance, although using the
terminology of a quit-claim deed,
may be regarded as something more
than such a deed and operate to
estop the grantor from asserting an
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after-acquired t i t l e , when it
recites further that a definite
estate is conveyed thereby, or
when the circumstances clearly
indicate that, as between the
parties thereto, a particular
interest or estate was intended to
be passed by the instrument.
This exception was implemented by the court in
McAdams v. Bailey,
where

the

169

Ind.

518,

court held

that

a

quitclaim deed,
on

the

theory

evidencing
that

a

82

N.E.

distinct

that

the

particular

1057

(1907)

recital

parties

in a

proceeded

interest was

thereby

conveyed, may be as effective to create an estoppel as a
warranty.
Brief

examination of

the Cook-Thornock Quit-

claim Deed reveals an obvious intent to convey a particular, identifiable, presently existing interest.
That deed provides in pertinent part:
The grantors intend by this instrument to convey to the grantee
only the rights reserved to the
grantee for coal, oil and other
minerals as may have been granted in
the orig in al patents to the abovedescr ibed land and as reserved in
(various indentif ied
documents)
in the official
records of Rich County, Utah.
(R. 224)
This

identification of

could not be more absolute.
convey

a

d efinite

estate

a

particular

interest

In addition, the intent to

·
is
c l ear

on

the

face of the

document.
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Due
acquired
court

to

title

find

these
is

COOK

factors,

the doctrine of after-

applicable.

obtained

Therefore,

title

to

should

the

the questioned

300

acres through adverse possession, title to the minerals
in

the

heirs of Aden

w.

therein

immediately vested

Thornock

through application of the doctrine of after-

acquired title.
In

brief,

as

the

doctrine

of

after-acquired

title is applicable to both the reservations of minerals
found in the Thornock-Johnson and Johnson-Cook deeds as
well as to the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed, should the
court

find

that

tioned

300

acres

COOK has

obtained

through adverse

title

to

the ques-

possession,

title to

the minerals is vested in THORNOCK •
.POINT III
THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT AS TO THE VALIDITY
OF THE COOK-THORNOCK QUITCLAIM DEED
In her Brief on Appeal, COOK questions the
validity

of

the

cook-Thornock

Quitclaim Deed

and

im-

pliedly asserts that a question of fact exists as to the
circumstances

of

its

execution.

However,

absent

the

unfounded allegations contained in Cook's Second Amended
Answer and Counterclaim (R.
on Appeal,

339-48) and in Cook's Brief

she has failed to produce any evidence which

would tend to support her allegation of the existence of
a question of fact.
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The
COOK'S

allegations

and

conclusions contained in

Second Amended Answer

and Counterclaim may not

properly be considered by this court.

Rule 56(e),

Rules of Civil Procedure provides,
shall

~

• aff id av its

• set forth such facts as would be admissible

in

evidence

the

Second

The
Amended

legal conclusions found in

Answer

would

not

be

admissible in

evidence at the time of trial and therefore may not be
considered

in

the

context

of

a

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.
In
given

addition,

at her

the

testimony

of Lois Cook

deposition directly contradicts the Con-

clusions and Allegations of the Second Amended Answer.
In her Answer,

COOK has denied executing the

Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed (R. 380).
10,

lines 11-16 of her deposition,

However, at

p~e

she admits that she

signed that deed at the request of her husband.
COOK
quitclaim
However,
she

deed
at

testified

further
under

alleges
"threats,

page 19,
that

that

she

coercion

lines 10-19 of

she

had

no

signed the
and

duress.'

her deposition

recollection

of

state-

ments made by Mr. Thornock and that she had no knowled~
of statements he may have made to her husband.
further

testifies

at

page

21,

lines

were no threats of physical violence,
52 and 53 of her deposition,

13-18

that there

and at pages

51

•

Cook acknowledged she was
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not forced to sign the quitclaim deed, that she was not
threatened,

that she was not coereced and that she has

no knowledge of any threats or coercion directed at her
husband.

In

addition,

she

acknowledged

that Aden

Thornock was not present at the time the quitclaim deed
was signed.
The

testimony of Lois Cook,

the transcript of her deposition,
properly before

is the only evidence

the court concerning the issue of the

validity of the quitclaim deed.
mony clearly

as contained in

indicates

that,

as

A review of her testia matter

of law,

the

execution of the quitclaim deed was not obtained through
threat, coercion or duress.
COOK attempts to raise an additional issue
concerning

the presence of

a handwritten

insertion on

the first page of the c.ook-Thornock quitclaim deed.
There is no

evidence before the court concerning that

insertion other than that it is present.

COOK acknowl-

edges that the only surviving witness to the execution
of that document,
recollection
execution

of

(COOK' s

Mrs.
the

Cook

herself,

circumstances

Brief on Appeal,

has

no

specific

surrounding

page 11) •

its

Due to

this absence of evidence, COOK may only speculate as to
the presence or absence of the insertion at the time of
the execution of the quitclaim deed.
judgment may

not

Clearly, summary

be set aside on the sole basis of
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speculation,

especially where,

as in the present case,

is !!.£ possibility that additional evidence might

there

be obtained.
As

to COOK'S

reference

to

the manner of the

taking of her deposition, THORNOCK assumes, as does this
Court, that the interests of appellant were protected

~

competent counsel.
In

summary,

on

the

record,

the only hint of

duress, coercion or estoppel is COOK'S characterization
of Aden Thornock' s requests as "hounding", however, her
specific testimony as to Mr.

Thornock' s conduct demon-

strates

of

that,

as

a

matter

law,

neither

duress,

threat, nor coercion were present.
CONCLUSION
COOK'S claim by adverse position to 300 of the
approximately 1,946 acres involved in the present actioo
must

fail

for

assertion of
validity of

that claim is an acknowledgment of the

the title of Aden

w.

Thornock to the same

As COOK does not contest the lower court's

parcel.
ruling

the reason that a prerequisite to the

concerning

the

reservations

of minerals

in the

Thornock-Johnson and Johnson-Cook deeds, acknowledgement
of

the validity of

stitutes

an

the title of Aden

admission

of THORNOCK'S

w.

Thornock con-

claim to quiet

title.
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The alleged defects in THORNOCK'S chain of
title may not properly be asserted by COOK as she claims
no interest in the land by virtue of those defects and
for the further reason that a defendant cannot defeat an
action to quiet

title by showing a superior title in

some third person.
As is apparent from a review of the transcript
of the deposition of Lois S. Cook, there is no question
of fact,

on

the

record,

as

to the validity of the

Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed.
Finally, even should the court find COOK'S
claim to 300 acres by adverse possession to be valid,
the title to the minerals therein has vested in Thornock
by virtue of application of the doctrine of afteracquired title.
Plaintiffs-respondents, THORNOCK, respectfully
request that this Court affirm the Judgment, and Decree
of Quiet Title, and Memorandum Decision of December 11,
1978 of the court below.
DATED this f(d

day of May, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

LeROY$. AXLAND, Esq.

iffs-Respondents
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State of Utah
Patent No.

State of Utah
Patent No.

15260 (80 A.)

15259 (273.88 A.)

JosepJ Hatch and
Ezra Hatch

Joseph E. Hatch
and company

A

B

c

I

I

\

z

z

No Conveyance

No Conveyance

z

z

I

\

various irrelevant conveyances

// /

Joseph Hatch and Katie Hatch

I

FOUR SISTERS
(Lota Kennedy, Leatha Spencer,
Vera Pearl, and Thelma McKinnon)
Aden

I

w.

Thornock

I
(with reservation of minerals)

I
Lawrence Johnson

I

(with reservation of minerals)

I

Howland Cook and Lois Cook

~
Claim

(Quit

for

Minerals)

~ Thornock

Aden W.

EXHIBIT "A II
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY:
This

is

to

certify that two copies of the

foregoing Brief of Respondents were hand delivered this
!ltJ1_ day of May,

1979, to Milton A. Oman, Attorney for

Appellant, Fifth Floor, American SAvings Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

